The nation that will insist upon drawing a broad line of distinction between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking by cowards.
-- Sir William Francis Butler
This seventh publication in the Historical Analysis Series addresses the American role in the Philippine Hukbalahap insurrection, provides insight and observations to contemporary planners, and examines the achievement and demonstrates how efforts of individuals, combined with American foreign policy initiatives and international events, prevented the collapse of an important allied nation. This case study analyzes successful U.S. Army involvement in a low intensity conflict for current and future planners, foreign policy specialists, and others interested in this form of conflict. The study tries to determine what conditions led to the near disaster of 1950 and to discover what steps were taken by the governments of the Philippines and the United States. It examines the insurgent movement, its origins, evolution, goals, tactics, and personality to shed new light on a successful anti-insurgency operation.